Being and Humans in Heideggers Letter on Humanism and in his Contribut

Being and Humans in Heidegger's Letter on Humanism and in his Contributions to Philosophy ABSTRACT: Heidegger's main question, the question of Being concerning human facticity, struggles to uncover the original ground to which humans belong, a ground from which modern society tends to uproot itself through the dominance of calculative and representational thinking. What is most dangerous for Heidegger about this process is that the original ground of humans and beings in general might be covered and forgotten to the extent that humans lose completely the sense of what they truly need. The task of philosophy is to help bring back humans and beings in general to the place which they originally belong, i.e., to their most fulfilled way of being which is their proper or own [das Eigene, eigen]. The term "En-own-ment" or "Ap-propri-ation" [Er-eign-is] — the key word in Heidegger's thinking since the 1930's — marks his attempt to think more originally than metaphysics the relation between Being and humans in terms of the being "enowned" of humans through Being and in terms of the belonging of humans to Being. I will rethink the question of this relation in reference to two of Heidegger's writings, and will focus on his struggle for a proper language which would be able to say what essentially remains concealed in metaphysical language: the truth (or ground) or Being as Ereignis. a) Preliminary remarks In our age of close encounter between manifold ways of thinking, believing and behaving one fundamental question which arises is: How can one find a proper measure for human life in a world which essentially lacks a common ground? The last great philosopher who, at the brink of the era of pluralism, struggled for a common ground ... ...-1938), GA vol. 65, ed. by F.-W. v. Hermann, Frankfurt am Main 1989. (3) See especially Heidegger, GA65, section 122. (4) I have no time, here, to develop the notion of an "andersanfà ¤ngliches Denken". (5) Anklang is the name of the first of the six fugues (Fuge) into which the Beitrà ¤ge are articulated. In their interrelatedness they constitute the realm of thinking of what Heidegger calls the transition from the first (Greek) beginning of Western history to the other beginning, which the thinking of Ereignis is meant to prepare. (6) See GA 9:323, where Heidegger says that Ek-sistenz is "das Stehen in der Lichtung des Seins". See also p. 350. (7) Unfortunately, I will have no time, here, to develop the question of the relation between humans and gods. (8) Heidegger moves, in the Beitrà ¤ge towards a radical simultaneity of beyng and beings.